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    Abstract-  Advent  of  Internet  has  resulted  in  e-commerce 
replacing traditional selling of digital products (such as songs, 
videos,movies,  software,  books,  documents,  images,  etc.) 
through shops. This  mode of sale can bring  the product  price 
down as infrastructure cost in setting up shops and retail chain is 
reduced. On downside, however, this may increase problem of 
piracy  as  digital  data  can  be  easily  copied,  manipulated  and 
transmitted.  To  protect  copyright  of  owner,  establish  right  of 
buyer on purchased copy and yet check data piracy, it is required 
that a rusted e-distribution system be built. Such a system should 
be able to ensure secure transaction between buyer and seller, 
check ownership and track the origin of unauthorized copies..The 
buyer  seller  watermarking  protocols  are    heavyweight 
protocols.These protocols require large computation power and 
network bandwidth.The heavyweight protocols could not be used 
for the resource constrained devices since the devices does not 
support battery power.A lightweight protocol has been proposed 
which is best  suited for the  resource constrained devices. The 
protocol  is  based  on  a  fast  asymmetric  encryption  with  novel 
simplification.In this approach the seller authenticates the buyer 
but does not learn which items are purchased. The protocol is 
designed in such a way that the buyers pay the right price without 
disclosing the purchased item, and the sellers are able to identify 
buyers that released pirated copies. The protocol is constructed 
based on the priced oblivious transfer and the existing techniques 
for asymmetric watermark embedding. 
 
    Index  Terms-  Buyer–seller  watermarking  protocol,  fair 
exchange, priced oblivious transfer (POT). 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
UYER-SELLER  watermarking  protocols  allow  copyright 
protection  of  digital  goods.  Digital  watermarks  have 
recently been proposed for the purposes of copy protection and 
copy  deterrence  for  multimedia  content.  In  copy  deterrence,  a 
content owner (seller) inserts a unique watermark into a copy of 
the  content  before  it  is  sold  to  a  buyer.  If  the  buyer  sells 
unauthorized  copies  of  the  watermarked  content,  then  these 
copies  can  be  traced  to  the  unlawful  reseller  (original  buyer) 
using a watermark detection algorithm. 
           Fast  growing  information  technology  permits  perfect 
duplication  and  cheap  distribution  for  digital  works.  The 
problems  associated  with  intellectual  property  protection  have 
become important issues. In the realm of security, encryption and 
digital watermarking are recognized as promising techniques for 
copyright  protection.  Encryption  is  to  prevent  unauthorized 
access to a digital content. The limitation is that once the content 
is  decrypted,  it  doesn’t  prevent  illegal  replications  by  an 
authorized  user.  Digital  watermarking,  complementing 
encryption techniques, provides provable copyright ownership by 
imperceptibly  embedding  the  seller’s  information  in  the 
distributed  content.  Similarly,  digital  fingerprinting  is  to  trace 
and  identify  copyright  violators  by  embedding  the  buyer’s 
information in the distributed content. 
          The  existing  buyer  seller  watermarking  protocols  are 
heavyweight  protocols.  These  protocols  require  large 
computation  power  and  network  bandwidth.  The  heavyweight 
protocols could not be used for the resource constrained devices 
since the device does not support battery power. A lightweight 
protocol has been proposed which is best suited for the resource 
constrained devices. The protocol is based on a fast asymmetric 
encryption with novel simplification..The protocol is designed in 
such a way that the buyers pay the right price without disclosing 
the purchased item, and the sellers are able to identify buyers that 
released  pirated  copies.  Consequently,  privacy  concerns 
discourage  online  e-commerce  [1],  and  regulations  to  enforce 
privacy protection are being promulgated [2]. 
 
II.  RELATED WORK 
           Fingerprinting  schemes  deter  people  from  illegally 
redistributing digital copies by enabling the seller of the data to 
identify the buyer.A scheme is said to be collusion-resistant [3] 
when it prevents a collusion of buyers up to a maximum size 
from  producing  nontraceable  copies.  In  asymmetric 
fingerprinting schemes [4], the fingerprinted copy is only known 
to the buyer at the end of the purchase protocol. Thanks to this 
property,  when  the  seller  finds  a  redistributed  copy,  he  can 
present it as a proof of the buyer’s misbehavior, and the buyer 
cannot claim that the copy was produced by the seller. In order to 
protect privacy, fingerprinting protocols that provide buyers with 
anonymity  have  been  proposed  [5].Buyer–seller  watermarking 
protocols [6] are asymmetric fingerprinting schemes in which the 
fingerprint is embedded by means of watermarking techniques. 
The basic idea is that each buyer obtains a slightly different copy 
of the digital content.Such difference, the watermark, does not 
harm  the  quality  of  the  copy  and  cannot  be  removed  by  the 
buyer. Some buyer–seller Watermarking protocols also provide 
buyers with anonymity [7]–[9].As noted in [10], anonymous e-
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commerce  protocols  have  several  disadvantages.  First,  they 
hinder  customer  management.  For  example,  the  seller  cannot 
give discounts to regular buyers or apply other loyalty marketing 
techniques.  Second,  they  have  to  be  used  together  with 
anonymous payment protocols (e.g., anonymous e-cash), which 
makes it impossible to use currently deployed payment protocols. 
Finally,  they  require  the  use  of  an  underlying  anonymous 
communication  network,  such  as  Tor.  It  is  well-known  that 
achieving strong anonymity in such networks is a difficult goal. 
Furthermore,  some  applications  allow  side-channel  attacks 
against anonymity. For example, in location-based services, the 
service  provider  learns  a  customer’s  location,  and  this 
information  can  be  used  to  identify  the  a  priori  anonymous 
customer  .Additionally,  e-commerce  protocols  are  usually 
analyzed in order to prove their fairness. Roughly speaking, fair 
exchange ensures that, at the end of the transaction, either the 
seller receives the payment and the buyer receives the purchased 
item, or both parties receive nothing. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, no fair buyer–seller watermarking protocol has been 
proposed. We propose a different approach to provide privacy 
protection  in  buyer–seller  watermarking  protocols.  In  our 
approach, based on oblivious e-commerce protocols, buyers are 
authenticated by the seller, but the seller does not learn which 
items  are  purchased.  This  overcomes  the  disadvantages  of 
anonymous purchase. Since buyers are authenticated, customer 
management  is  eased  and  currently  deployed  methods  of 
payment  can  be  utilized.  As  possible  disadvantages,  one  can 
argue that the seller can find it difficult to learn which However, 
as noted in, this information can be obtained by other  means, 
e.g., by conducting marketing research. 
         We  define  formally  privacy-preserving  buyer–seller 
watermarking (PBSW) protocols, i.e., buyer–seller watermarking 
protocols  in  which  the  seller  does  not  learn  which  items  are 
purchased.  We  also  provide  a  construction  of  such  a  protocol 
based  on  existing  techniques  for  asymmetric  watermark 
embedding and on priced oblivious transfer (POT). (POT is the 
key building block of oblivious e-commerce protocols.) Finally, 
we explain how to extend our protocol to provide fair exchange. 
 
III.  SYSTEM MODEL 
         The privacy preserving buyer seller watermarking protocol 
based  on  niederreiter  encryption  [11],  which  makes  use  of  a 
particular asymmetric encryption. 
 
Niederreiter Asymmetric Encryption 
        First, we review the cryptographic primitive — Niederreiter 
         Asymmetric encryption scheme .Setup. The public key and 
secret key are built by generating several matrices and an (n, k)-
linear  code.S:  A  random  (n−k)×(n−k)  binary  non-singular 
matrix.H: An (n−k)×n parity-check matrix H for a binary  
(n, k)-linear code that can correct t errors, and for H an efficient 
decoding algorithm ψ is known. 
 
P: A random n × n permutation matrix. 
 
Make use of (S, H, P) to compute an (n − k) × n matrix 
 
 
K = SHP, let 
     Public Key: PK=(K, t) 
     Secret Key: SK=(S, P, ψ) 
 
Encryption. Given a clear text msg which is encoded as an n-bit 
binary vector, let KT denote the transpose of K, then 
the ciphertext is computed as follows: 
c = msg   KT 
 
      Where  msg  contains  no  more  than  t  1’s.  This  is  because 
Niederreiter scheme employs a (n, k)-linear code with the 
capability of decoding less than t errors. If the Hamming weight 
of clear text WH(msg) ≤ t, then the mapping of 
clear text to ciphertext is injective. 
 
Decryption. Given an input c, decryption algorithm computes cT 
from c, and S−1 from matrix S to get the following, 
H(P   msgT) = S−1   cT 
where S−1 denotes the inverse of the matrix S.Since it is known 
by the decoder an efficient decoding algorithm 
Ψ for H, when WH (msg) ≤ t, the following holds: 
 
P   msgT = ψ (S−1   cT) 
Hence, it is easy to compute cleartext msg by: 
 
MsgT = P−1(P   msgT) 
Remark. In particular, it is clear to see that quite simple matrix 
operations are needed in the encryption process. Thus, 
the encryption could be executed very fast. 
 
A Basic Protocol 
           A direct application of asymmetric encryption would be to 
simply encrypt the real ID of the device with the server’s public 
key, and send the resulting ciphertext c to the server. Then the 
server takes advantage of its secret key to recover all users’ ID, 
which  handles  the  ID  directly  after  decoding  and  enjoys  the 
convenience of the privacy (ID) management. Consequently, this 
protocol successfully avoids maintaining any synchronization or 
the exhaustive search in the database that typically costs a lot of 
resources  when  a  huge  number  of  IDs  need  to  be  managed. 
Obviously,  the  security  of  the  above  protocol  relies  on  the 
Niederreiter asymmetric encryption [12]. Anyone who intends to 
know  the  encrypted  ID  will  have  to  break  the  Niederreiter 
asymmetric encryption. 
         More  importantly,  it  is  noteworthy  that  not  all  secure 
asymmetric encryptions are eligible for our approach, because 
Most  of  the  asymmetric  encryptions  are  too  heavy  to  run  on 
severely  resource-constrained  devices.  However,  since  the 
Niederreiter scheme has a very speedy encryption and especially 
by  simplification  technique,  the  operation  of  device  can  be 
efficiently accomplished. In the following, we describe the basic 
protocol.  The  protocol  employs  the  Niederreiter  encryption  to 
generate  ciphertext  c  according  to  the  device’s  ID  d  and  a 
randomly generated number r, such that clear text msg = r||d, 
where “||” denotes the bit concatenation. Meanwhile, ciphertext c 
could be also considered as a PID corresponding to d.  
Let  R,  ID  denote  the  sets  of  random  number  and  valid  ID 
respectively, such that, 
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R = {r ∈ {0, 1} n1 |WH(r) = t1} 
ID = {d ∈ {0, 1} n2 |WH (d) = t2} 
 
           Where  all  the  integers  are  positive  and  t  =  t1+t2,  n  = 
n1+n2. It is obvious to see that the number of ID, _ID = _n2 t2 _, 
where  _ is the binomial coefficient. Suppose K be composed of 
two sub-matrices K1, K2, corresponding to r, d respectively (See 
Figure.1).  For  a  certain  SK  of  the  server  and  an  ID  d  of  the 
device, c2 = d  KT2 is fixed. Consequently, it is convenient to 
pre-distribute the value c2 to the device beforehand, and compute 
r and K1 to obtain c1, which drastically saves the computation 
for the device. Besides, c2 is stored instead of both d and K2, 
which further saves the memory cost. More precisely, the basic 
protocol consists of several phases, which are briefly described in 
the following. Key Generation. The system first generates public 
key and secret key of the server as (PK,SK), such that  
 
PK= (K, t), 
SK=(S, P, ψ). Since c2 part of the computation of PID 
 
 
Fig. 1: Niederreiter Encryption 
 
 
Public Key: PK= (K1, t1) 
Secret Key: SK=(S, P, ψ) 
The K1 is the left (n − k) × n1 matrix of K, and K2 is 
The remained (n − k) × n2 part of K, namely K = [K1K2]. 
 
ID Allocation. The server chooses d ∈ ID as device’s identity 
and computes 
 
c2 = d   KT2 
Then c2 together with K1 will be assigned to the device, where 
c2 needs to be kept secret. 
 
Query  and  Reply.  In  this  phase,  the  server  queries  the 
unknowndevice for its ID. The device chooses a random number 
r ∈ R, computes 
c1 = r   KT1 
and then sends back the pseudo-ID PID to the server, as 
PID = c1 ⊕ c2 
 
ID Retrieval. Since PID is actually an encryption of msg =r||d 
with public key PK, such that, 
PID = c1 ⊕ c2 = (r   KT1) ⊕ (d   KT2) = (r||d)   KTon receiving 
the PID, the server makes use of secret key 
SK=(S, P, ψ) to recover d. 
 
 
 
IV.  TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES 
A. Blind Watermarking 
         A blind and readable watermarking scheme consists of a 
setup  algorithm,  a  watermark  embedding  algorithm,  and  a 
watermark  detection  algorithm  .outputs  a  secret  watermarking 
key,  a  message  space,  and  a  watermark  space.  ,  on  input, 
message, and watermark, outputs a watermarked message. The 
algorithm can be computed in the encrypted domain, where both 
and the result are encrypted with a public key of a public key 
encryption  scheme.  The  algorithm  outputs  the  watermark 
embedded in .A secure watermarking scheme should be robust 
and collusion resistant. Let be a distortion metric that quantifies 
the  distortion  suffered  by  a  watermarked  content  when  it 
underwent  signal  processing  operations  such  as  compression, 
filtering, noise addition, desynchronization, cropping, insertions, 
mosaicing,  and  collage.  Let  be  a  distorted  content.  The 
robustness property requires that under a distortion metric and a 
distortion bound, given output by and output by, outputs  with 
overwhelming  probability  if  .The  collusion  resistance  property 
requires that collusion up to parties cannot manipulate or remove 
the  watermark  from  a  watermarked  content  by  comparing  or 
composing their differently  watermarked copies. This property 
can be formalized 
           Definition  1  (Collusion  Resistant  Watermarking):  The 
collusion  resistance  property  is  defined  through  the  following 
game between a challenger and an adversary. • Challenge. Runs 
to get, picks random original content, and, for to, picks random 
watermark and runs .sends to. • Response. outputs watermarked 
content  .wins  if  there  exists  such  that  and  outputs  watermark 
such  that,  for  to  ,  .A  blind  watermarking  scheme  is  collusion 
resistant  if  all  p.p.t.  adversaries  win  the  game  above  with 
negligible probability. Current practical  watermarking schemes 
do not provide collusion-resistance against any p.p.t. adversary. 
We assume that the watermarking scheme used to instantiate the 
protocol fulfills this definition, and thus  we conclude that our 
protocol is secure against any p.p.t. adversary. When the protocol 
is instantiated with a concrete watermarking scheme, the security 
offered  against  malicious  buyers  is  lowered  to  the  security 
offered by the watermarking scheme. 
 
B. Signature Schemes 
          A  signature  scheme  consists  of  the  algorithms,  and. 
Outputs a secret key and a public key . Outputs a signature of 
message.  Outputs  if  is  a  valid  signature  of  and  otherwise.  A 
signature  scheme  must  be  correct  and  unforgeable.  Informally 
speaking, correctness implies that the algorithm always accepts 
an honestly generated signature. Existential unforgeability means 
that  no  p.p.t.adversary  should  be  able  to  output  a  message-
signature pair unless he has previously obtained a signature on. 
 
C. Homomorphic Encryption 
          A public key encryption scheme consists of the algorithms 
and. Outputs a public key and a secret key. Outputs a ciphertext 
on input a public key and a message. Outputs the message on 
input  the  ciphertext  and  the  secret  key.  Roughly  speaking, 
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guarantees that an adversary does not get any knowledge about 
from . 
         We employ a homomorphic public key encryption scheme 
that  supports  two  operations.  An  operation  that,  on  input  two 
ciphertexts and that encrypts messages and, outputs a ciphertext 
that encrypts the addition of the messages, and an operation that, 
on input a message and a ciphertext, outputs a ciphertext that 
encrypts the multiplication of the messages. The homomorphic 
public  key  encryption  scheme  proposed  by  Paillier,  and  its 
generalization by Damgård and Jurik, support these operations, 
and therefore can be used to instantiate the encryption scheme In 
our construction we need a function that, on input a bit and an 
encryption of a bit , computes the encryption , where denotes the 
exclusive or operation. 
. 
D. Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge 
          A  zero-knowledge  proof  of  knowledge  is  a  two-party 
protocol between a prover and a verifier. The prover proves to 
the  verifier  knowledge  of  some  secret  input  that  fulfils  some 
statement  without  disclosing  this  input  to  the  verifier.  The 
protocol should fulfil two properties. First, it should be a proof of 
knowledge,  i.e.,  a  prover  without  the  knowledge  of  the  secret 
input  convinces  the  verifier  with  negligible  probability.  More 
technically, there exists a knowledge extractor that extracts the 
secret  input  from  a  successful  prover  with  all  but  negligible 
probability.  Second,  it  should  be  zero-knowledge,  i.e.,  the 
verifier does not learn any information about the secret input. 
More  technically,  for  all  possible  verifiers  there  exists  a 
simulator that, without knowledge of the secret input, yields a 
transcript that cannot be distinguished from the interaction with a 
real prover.To express a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, we 
follow the notation introduced by Camenisch and Stadler.  
             For  example,  denotes  a  “zero knowledge  proof  of 
knowledge of secret input such that.” Letters in the parenthesis, 
in this example , denote the secret input, while and the function 
are also known to the verifier.We employ a proof of knowledge , 
i.e., a proof that is a correct encryption under of the secret key 
related with public key , so that a party in possession of the secret 
key  related  with  can  recover  from  .  The  verifiable  encryption 
schemes  proposed  by  Camenisch  et  al.    And  by  Poupard  and 
Stern, which are provided with such a proof of knowledge, can 
be  employed  to  instantiate  the  encryption  scheme  used  in  our 
construction we also use a proof of knowledge of the statement, 
i.e., a proof that the value encrypted in ciphertext under public 
key is a bit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V.  PBSW PROTOCOL 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Phases of PBSW protocol: initialization (top), 
purchase (middle), arbitration (bottom). 
 
            PBSW protocol is based on POT. POT allows buyers to 
purchase messages from the seller without the seller learning 
Which  messages  are  bought.  Existing  secure  POT  schemes 
follow an assisted decryption approach in which the interaction 
between  a  seller  and  a  buyer  is  divided  into  an  initialization 
phase  and  several  purchase  phases.  In  the  initialization  phase, 
encrypts the messages to be sold and sends the ciphertexts to. In 
each purchase phase, helps to decrypt one of the ciphertexts via 
an interactive protocol.                
          
VI.  SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
             The security of the proposals relies on the Niederreiter 
encryption  and  the  hash  function  h,  which  is  shown  in  the 
following theorem. 
 
             Theorem  1  If  the  Niederriter  encryption  is  one way 
secure and the one way hash function is collision resistant, then 
the proposed protocols are secure against active attacks. 
       
           Proof.  Generally  speaking,  the  intuition  behind  the 
security  is  that  if  the  privacy  information  ID  d  is  cracked  or 
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By an active adversary A, then A can either break the Niederreiter 
encryption or find a collision of hash function h. 
 
We show the security of explicit auxiliary protocol in details. 
            1.  When  an  active  adversary  A  intends  to  steal  the  ID 
from certain device D, A pretends to be S. A can select adaptive, 
non-random cha and send it to D. According to the response of 
D, the adversary gets the following.• What A can obtain from D 
is exactly the encryption of randomness r and ID, and a hash 
value aux. Note here that the cha chosen by A is not included 
In the cleartext, but is a partial pre-image of the hash value aux. 
The  r  is  chosen  by  the  D,  and  ID  embedded  in  c2  is  pre-
computed  and  stored  in  the  D,  out  of  control  of  A.  From  a 
cryptographic point of view, it means that the attack employed 
by A is weaker than the chosen-plaintext attack, in which A can 
get the encryption of what he chooses. If A can guess the ID, then 
he must be able to invert the Niederreiter encryption and thus 
break  its  one-wayness,only  by  a  weaker  attack  than  chosen-
plaintext  attack!  The  above  is  contradicting  to  the  security  of 
Niederreiter  encryption  which  is  known  as  one-way  secure 
against chosen-plaintext attack. 
              Without breaking the Niederreiter encryption, A has to 
invert hash function h (c2||r||cha). The only advantage is that A 
is able to choose cha as he likes. It is obviously impossible if a 
secure hash function is applied.From the above, it is easy to see 
that A has to break the encryption or find full pre-image of hash 
function, to get the privacy information ID. 
 
VII.  FAIR PRIVACY-PRESERVING PBSW PROTOCOL 
           Recently,  a  transformation  that  takes  as  input  a  secure 
POT scheme and turns it into an optimistic fair POT scheme has 
been proposed. This transformation requires a neutral third party, 
an adjudicator, who is only involved in case of dispute between a 
seller and a buyer (hence the protocol is called optimistic).Other 
fair  e-commerce  protocols  that  do  not  protect  privacy  also 
require the involvement of a third party .The transformation is 
based  on  the  use  of  verifiably  encrypted  signatures  (VES)  . 
Roughly  speaking,  a  VES  is  a  signature  encrypted  under  the 
public key of the adjudicator that can be publicly verified; i.e., 
the  verifier  can  check  that  the  ciphertext  contains  a  valid 
signature  without  the  secret  key  of  the  adjudicator.  The 
transformation works as follows. The buyer computes a VES on 
her purchase request, and sends to the seller.Upon receiving a 
correct response from seller, the buyer reveals a valid signature 
on her request. This signature can be used by the seller to prove 
that the buyer accepted the result and that a payment was done. If 
a malicious buyer does not reveal the signature, the adjudicator, 
upon  being  requested  by  the  seller,  can  verify  that  the  seller 
fulfilled his delivery obligations and, in that case, extract a valid 
signature from the VES. Similarly, if a malicious seller does not 
fulfil  his  delivery  obligations,  the  adjudicator,  upon  being 
requested by the buyer, can tell the seller to fulfil them and, in 
the  end,  send  the  seller  a  valid  signature.We  refers  to  for  a 
detailed  description.  One  of  the  appealing  properties  of  this 
transformation  is  that  it  adds  very  little  overhead  in  terms  of 
communication and computation.Our PBSW protocol can also be 
extended to achieve fairness by applying this transformation to 
the POT scheme used as a building block. In our protocol, the 
role of the adjudicator can be played by the judge. Both judge 
and buyers have to compute a key pair as defined in the VES 
scheme  used  and  register  the  public  key  at  the  registration 
authority. 
 
VIII.  EFFICIENCY 
           The  efficiency  of  our  construction  depends  on  the 
efficiency of the building blocks used to instantiate it. Efficiency 
measurements  for  the  asymmetric  watermark  embedding 
technique  we  employ  (algorithms  ,  ,  ,  )  can  be  found  in  [9], 
which  describes  and  implements  an  instantiation  based  on  the 
homomorphic public key encryption scheme due to Paillier [16]. 
In [9], images of size 512 512 pixels are employed as digital 
content offered by , whose size after embedding thewatermark in 
the  encrypted  domain  is  536,  870,  912  bits  when  each  DCT 
coefficient  is  encrypted,  or  6,  318,  080  bits  when  composite 
signal  representation  is  used.  In  the  following,  we  employ 
watermarked  messages  of  those  sizes  as  input  to  the  POT 
scheme.To  evaluate  the  performance  of  the  whole  PBSW 
protocol,we  implement  the  POT  scheme  proposed  in    a 
workstation equipped with an IntelCore2Duo processor at 3 GHz 
and 4 Gbyte of RAM. All the functionalities are implemented in 
the C programming language. We use the PBC library for elliptic 
curve  and  pairing  operations.  We  select  type  A  pairings 
constructed on the curve over the field for a 512-bit prime mod 4. 
For  other  cryptographic  primitives,  we  employ  the  OpenSSL 
library.3 specifically; we employ RIPEMD-160 as hash function 
and AES in counter mode as block cipher. The efficiency of the 
POT  scheme  in  terms  of  computation  and  communication 
depends  on  the  selection  of  three  parameters:  the  number  of 
messages offered by, the size of the watermarked messages, and 
the values and that define the maximum deposit allowed .The 
performance of the initialization phase (algorithms and) depends 
on the number of  messages  and on the  message  size. Table I 
shows  performance  measurements  when  is  100,  1000,  and  10 
000, and when the message size is 536, 870, 912 and 6, 318, 080 
bits. 
 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
          Copyright protection for the digital contents is provided. 
Buyers purchase from sellers without the seller learning the items 
they  buy.  Best  suited  for  the  resource  constrained  devices. 
Improved  power  consumption  and  network  bandwidth 
utilization. It provides both buyers and sellers with optimistic fair 
exchange.The efficiency of the protocol is improved . 
The future  work includes the signal processing  using Discrete 
Wavelet Transform and Discrete Cosine Transform. The wavelet 
transform has emerged as a cutting edge technology, within the 
field  of  image  compression.  Wavelet  based  coding  provides 
substantial  improvements  in  picture  quality  at  higher 
compression  ratios.  DWT  yields  higher  compression  ratio  and 
better visual quality.  
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